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vAbstract
An Analysis of Open Security Issues of Android Interfaces to Cloud Computing
Platforms
Corey Andrew Beres
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Smartphone usage is on the rise and some may argue that these devices are ubiquitous in
today’s society, even among non-technical users. To remain competitive, mobile devices
and applications need to quickly perform tasks with as minimal as possible impact on
battery life. The emergence of cloud computing, open-source cloud platforms, and cloud-
supported ventures such as Apple iCloud and Amazon Silk provide new and promising
methods to improve device and application performance. However, little work has been
done to examine the security of offloading processing from mobile devices to cloud services
and the performance effects of implementing security features. This work aims to answer
the questions that arise in securing mobile applications that communicate with the cloud.
Via a proof-of-concept application that offloaded resource-intensive computations to
an open-source cloud computing platform, the security of cloud computing and Android
was studied. It was found that, by following recommended coding practices, the cloud-
smartphone security landscape could be significantly improved. Further security enhance-
ments were also recommended and summarized. Additionally, performance was analyzed,
and it was found that mobile device applications benefit heavily from cloud support and that
features such as secure authentication and encryption do not noticeably impact application
performance.
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Introduction
Today’s IT industry is witnessing the unfolding of a very interesting scenario. Public
cloud usage is on the rise; in November 2006, merely 1,000 Amazon EC2 instances were
launched per day. By September 2009, the number was estimated to have risen to over
40,000 instances launched per day [1]. This trend is shown in Figure 1.1. Academic in-
terest in cloud computing has increased exponentially as well, as shown in Figure 1.2. In
addition to the growing acceptance of public cloud computing, the release of open-source
private cloud computing platforms such as Eucalyptus and Nimbus have created the possi-
bility of installing a cloud even in a home.
Figure 1.1: Amazon EC2 instances launched per day as observed by RightScale [1]
At the same time, smartphone usage is increasing, and these devices are becoming
ubiquitous, even among users without technical backgrounds. For instance, [2] found that
smartphone adoption in the United States rose from 17 % to 27 % over the course of 2010.
2Figure 1.2: Academic interest in cloud computing according to the number of search results for
“cloud computing” on IEEE Xplore
In some European countries, the numbers are much higher. Spain’s adoption rate rose to
38 %, up from 27 % the previous year. These trends are shown in Figure 1.3.
As smartphone usage grows, the resources available to such devices remain limited.
Even as battery technology improves, clock speeds rise, and applications access the Internet
for new purposes, limiting the amount of time a device can be used without external power.
Conveniently, cloud computing is becoming increasingly available. The technology and
motivation exist to offload work from smartphones with limited resources to the energy-
and processor-rich cloud.
Several existing mobile applications take advantage of the cloud. Microsoft’s Project
Hawaii [5] is a software development kit targeted to students that allows developers to
leverage services including a relay service, a rendezvous service, optical character recogni-
tion, and speech-to-text in the cloud. Access to Microsoft’s Windows Azure cloud platform
is also supported. Currently the project supports only Windows devices.
In May 2011, Apple unveiled its own cloud venture, iCloud [6]. The service allows
users to store data in the cloud, including music, photographs, documents, books, and
contacts. The data can be retrieved by supported Apple devices.
Popular Android applications like Google Goggles [7] offload work to the cloud. Gog-
gles is a visual search application created by Google that allows users to take photographs
of objects to find more information on those objects. The application works by sending
the photos to the cloud, where they are processed on Google’s servers. The cloud then
returns search results to users’ mobile devices. Another Android application that leverages
the cloud is Amazon Silk [8], a web browser created by Amazon and available on Kindle
devices that offloads processing and caching to Amazon EC2.
3Figure 1.3: Smartphone adoption by market [2]
However, there are many areas for vulnerabilities to develop when a smartphone and a
cloud interact. These include storage of possibly secure data once it arrives on mobile de-
vices, storage of possibly secure data on the cloud, and secure transmission of data between
the cloud and devices. Additionally, there are many instances of malware that threaten se-
curity of mobile devices. Figure 1.4 shows the growth in malware on mobile platforms
from 2009 to 2011 (over which time the amount of malware has doubled) as recorded by
McAfee [3]. Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of malware by mobile platform; Android
was a target for the majority of malware considered in the survey. Additionally, there have
been numerous instances of impropoper management of private data by applications as in
[9] and [10].
The scenario of cloud-smartphone interaction opens many uncertainties, such as the
vulnerabilities that arise when a smartphone and a cloud commingle. Very little research
exists on this topic, and the specific vulnerabilities have not been concretely defined. As
such, no answers have been offered as to whether security needs to be improved and what
specific security features need to be added and expanded. This thesis is mainly concerned
with the Android operating system.
In an effort to clarify those uncertainties, CloudSmart was created. This software sys-
tem tied together an Android smartphone with a Eucalyptus private cloud. The system
provided an interface on the smartphone, offloaded work to a cloud, and assembled and
returned the results from the cloud to the smartphone. A specific situation in which the
cloud would be very advantageous was imagined, and it proceeds as follows:
1. Ray trace a scene.
2. Retrieve images from the Web or a local cache.
4Figure 1.4: Growth in malware on mobile platforms [3]
Figure 1.5: Breakdown of malware by mobile platforms, Q2 2011 [3]
53. Compare the ray-traced scene to the images and find the closest match.
Through this work, common and possible security practices that posed security risks
to Android devices, the cloud, and users were identified. Similarly, vulnerabilities in the
applications were identified. Vulnerabilities that posed substantial risks were identified,
allowing them to be addressed with future research. For those goals, a stronger focus was
placed on the Android end of the spectrum rather than the cloud end. The work presented
here is not intended to be a comprehensive security solution.
With risks identified, methods of exploitation described, and solutions proposed, the
results of the work will facilitate the development to better and more comprehensive An-
droid and cloud security models. Proposed solutions can be implemented and improved,
and the results will exist for future researchers interested in the critical areas that might
pose security threats.
Chapter 2 includes a discussion of past work related to this project. In Chapter 3,
the specific application and its implementation are explained, including a list of security
features and practices that were found to be important. Chapter 4 contains performance
results from the application developed along with explanations of how the results were
found.
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Related Work
The concept of a cloud-computing interface for a smartphone is relatively new. Amazon
EC2 and Eucalyptus were officially released in 2008, while the Amazon Web Services
SDK for Android was unveiled at the end of 2010. As of October 2011, Eucalyptus lacks
an Android interface. However, there are some projects in which the security of Android
and the cloud was addressed.
Two similar projects with intentions to secure the Android landscape are Saint [11] and
Kirin [12]. According to its authors, Saint is a framework for developers that allows for “ap-
plications to protect themselves.” This goal was accomplished by adding developer-defined
installation-time and run-time policies. A main benefit of Saint is that it can add dynamic
protection for applications, whereas most built-in security features provide static behavior.
The installation-time protection included signature-based policies and configuration-based
policies. The former allows applications that declared permissions to grant their permis-
sions based on signatures of requesting applications, while the latter performs the same feat
based on the requesting applications’ configurations (e.g.the permissions requested and its
version). At run-time, the previous two policies are in effect along with a context-based
policy, which limits the inter-process communication (IPC) between two applications based
on the state of the phone, (i.e.what hardware is active). At run-time, a signature-based pol-
icy would limit IPC based on the signatures of applications, while a configuration-based
policy would limit IPC based on the configurations of the applications in question. For
run-time protection, Saint acts as a middle-man for IPC.
According to the authors, “Saint was implemented as a modification to the Android 1.5
OS.” Requiring modifications to Android is the main limiting factor to the adoption and
usefulness of Saint. Also, the Saint package installer requires Android’s PackageParser
class, which is hidden. In addition, the application would most likely require the IN-
STALL PACKAGES permission, which is not available to applications installed from the
Android Market. Even if Saint were added to the Android OS, the additional restrictions
would be up to developers to define; thus its use would be optional.
Kirin is another framework for Android. Its developers focused on adding policies that
are checked during the installation of new applications. These fell into three categories:
regular Android permissions, mutual exclusion of permissions (permissions that cannot be
held simultaneously by an application), and rights dependence (permissions that must be
held if another permission is held). Specifically, the policies introduced included:
7• Explicit permission must be granted to make voice calls.
• Applications that were granted dangerous permissions much have no unprotected
components.
• Only system applications can interface with hardware and process outgoing calls.
• Applications that can record audio cannot have Internet access and cannot pass data
to applications that have Internet access.
• Applications that can access WiFi or a device’s network state must have the Internet
permission.
• Applications can receive SMS updates and location updates only from trusted system
components.
Kirin addressed several deficiencies present in Android, and, combined with compulsory
and wise use of Saint, it would lead to a more secure Android environment. However, Kirin
suffers from the same downfalls of Saint: notably the requirement of classes hidden from
the SDK. Additionally, the authors of Kirin and Saint did not specifically address cloud
interaction.
The creators of [13] aimed to identify when a device was compromised as quickly
as possible while maintaining the efficiency of this detection. The project was named
Paranoid Android, and it was accomplished by emulating Android devices in the cloud. The
authors’ example implementation detected intrusions with tamper-evident secure storage,
detection of software errors in Android, memory analysis, open-source antivirus software,
and methods to scan memory for malicious code, but they maintained that any check could
be implemented, with the detection time proportional to the number of checks performed.
While the project’s goals differ from this project’s goals, its usefulness in monitoring the
security of smartphones connected to the cloud is intriguing.
A project with similar goals to this project but with a different means and focus is
described in [14]. The goal of CloneCloud was to offload work automatically for any
application from smartphones to the cloud. This was accomplished by a method similar
to that of Paranoid Android. Devices were emulated and “cloned” to run in the cloud.
Threads of execution were automatically migrated by the CloneCloud framework to the
cloud, where they executed and took advantage of the hardware of much more powerful
servers until the threads were merged back into the original process. This project was
based on an early version of the Android mobile operating system.
Most of the project’s work involves the decisions of when to offload work, how to send
threads to the device clones on the cloud, and how to return the threads to mobile devices.
The end results of the application included a speed-up of execution time of up to 20 times
and up to a 20-times decrease in battery usage. While the results are very promising,
the focus of the project was application performance, and security was not a concern. The
project also required modifications to the Android operating system that could not be easily
rolled out on-demand to any smartphone.
82.1 Cloud security
Cloud security has been studied in many projects, including [15] in which the evolution
and modern applications of security features were explained, and [16] in which modern
security features like WS-Security and Transport Layer Security (TLS) were explained.
As described in those projects, security in the cloud includes those features found in the
desktop and server realms. Users are isolated from each other and have limited permissions.
Virtual machines isolate running software and memory within a physical machine. A more
interesting case results when protecting access to a cloud.
WS-Security, short for Web Services Security, is an extension to SOAP that defines
“how to provide integrity, confidentiality and authentication for SOAP messages” [16].
SOAP, or Simple Object Access Protocol, is a protocol that defines how to transfer infor-
mation between Web services. It relies on the XML standards XML Signature and XML
Encryption, and it defines the X.509 certificate. XML Signature defines how XML markup
can be signed to authenticate messages. Very simplified, the standard works by hashing
message parts, signing an element, and storing the result of the signature in another ele-
ment, which is included in the security header. XML Encryption allows for XML markup
to be encrypted. The encrypted markup is separated into two elements, the encrypted data
and the key used for the encryption, which is also encrypted, this time using the public key
of the recipient.
Transport Layer Security consists of two parts: the Record Layer encrypts data, and
the Handshake is responsible for authenticating servers and clients. The most common
usage of TLS begins with a server outfitted with an X.509 certificate issued from a trusted
certificate authority. During the handshake, the client receives the certificate from the server
and verifies its contents. If the certificate cannot be verified, the user is prompted to accept
or reject the certificate. The vulnerabilities begin here, as users may quickly click “Accept”
and “Okay” to reach their desired content without understanding the risks that were taken.
Attacks to circumvent these cloud security mechanisms exist, and they are described in
[16]. XML Signature Element Wrapping involves stealing a signed SOAP message body
and placing it inside the SOAP header of a new message. The body of the new message
describes the action the attacker wants to perform. This allows an attacker to perform
his own actions with the credentials of a different, legitimate user. The attack was used
in 2008 to exploit Amazon EC2. Another attack is a metadata spoofing attack in which a
Web Service’s metadata is altered, resulting in unintended execution of commands different
from the commands they intended to execute. This attack can happen after a user happens
upon this invalid metadata. A final attack comes in the form of the classic denial of service
attack, which, due to the elastic nature of the cloud, could potentially bring down an entire
cloud as exponentially more resources are provisioned to endure the attack.
Another security concern is the main interface to the cloud: the Web browser. Web
browsers do not take advantage of XML Security and XML Encryption. Rather, they use
the encryption features of TLS only, and the signature is used only during the handshake.
Additionally, the Same Origin Policy (SOP), which browsers use to identify origins of
tokens and scripts, can be duped by invalid and outdated DNS cache data. The authors of
[16] concluded that authentication via browsers is insecure because Web browsers cannot
9“issue XML based security tokens,” and security tokens are stored within the browser where
they are protected only by SOP.
Additional issues described in [15] include the lack of reputation fate-sharing, a lack
of mutual auditability, the possibility that administrators are seen as “decision bottlenecks”
as they enforce tighter restrictions upon users who seek immediate access, and side- and
covert-channel attacks as potentially competing entities run their software on possibly the
same machine within the cloud. The previously described vulnerabilities are summarized
in Table 2.1.
2.2 Android security
As described in [17] and [18], the security situation with Android is similar to that of cloud
computing in that a number of security features are inherited from the desktop realm along
with several additional attributes that tighten the security model. These mechanisms are
summarized in Table 2.2. Features found in desktops include POSIX users, file permis-
sions, virtual machines, and the Java language. The first three isolate applications from
each other. POSIX users have been adapted to Android such that each application runs as
its own user; thus it can save files that only the application can access, and it cannot access
the private files of other applications. Virtual machines have also been adapted to Android:
each application runs in its own virtual machine in order to isolate memory . Finally, the
Android SDK supports only Java, which forces users to take advantage of Java’s type safety
and memory management that prevent memory-level attacks.
The most prominent security feature unique to Android is the permissions system [19].
Permissions are defined such that dangerous mechanisms within Android are protected,
including hardware resources like Bluetooth, WiFi, the phone, microphone, and external
storage. Applications must have the necessary permissions granted to them when they
access such resources. These permissions are granted by the user upon installation of ap-
plications, and they cannot change. An application cannot be installed if any permissions
are rejected. Finally, applications can also be protected with permissions. An application
can require that the applications that launch it hold certain permissions. The benefits of the
permissions system are that users know what critical resources an application will access
and users can identify dangerous combinations of resources.
Additional Android-specific security features include the following: component encap-
sulation, which allows components of applications to be declared as private, thus preventing
their access by other applications; application signing, which identifies the developers of
applications; mobile carrier security features, which authenticate phone users with SIM
cards; and Intent filters. Intents [20] are a feature of the Android SDK, and they are used
when an application attempts to start another application (allowing the source application
to identify what application it would like to start, either by name or by attributes of possible
matches). Intent filters limit the scenarios in which applications can be launched, and they
can be defined on a per-component basis. Application components are the main processes
of these applications; the most common components are activities (foreground processes
that provide a visible user interface) and services (background processes).
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Table 2.1: Summary of cloud vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Consequences
XML Signature Element Wrapping: includ-
ing a valid signature in an otherwise invalid
SOAP message.
In 2008, an attacker performed “arbitrary EC2
operations” with a legitimate user’s creden-
tials
Web browsers lack support for XML Signa-
ture and XML Encryption.
Credentials can be moved from one machine
to another to appear as a different user.
Web browsers rely on same-origin policy
(SOP). SOP can be duped via DNS cache poi-
soning.
Browsers will allow scripts to access files and
run other scripts they would not otherwise be
able to access. Browsers will accept invalid
tokens.
Browsers cannot generate valid XML tokens. Tokens can be moved from one computer to
another, where the only defense is the SOP.
Cloud Malware Injection Attack: attacker
creates a malicious VM, adds it to the cloud
system, tricks the system into thinking it’s a
valid VM, and finally executes code with the
instance.
Code can be executed by a malicious VM. It
may not have the same restrictions as valid
VMs.
Metadata Spoofing Attack: attacker changes
metadata sent from the cloud; attacker can
change a service’s WSDL so that calls to one
command look like a different command.
Users can unknowingly execute commands.
Denial of Service attack Cloud will bring up more VMs, which might
slow down other VMs until they crash.
Reputation fate-sharing and lack of mutual
auditability
Business reputations could be damaged be-
cause users or providers act maliciously.
Administrators becoming “decision bottle-
necks”
Users will try to bypass administrative restric-
tions.
Side- and covert-channel attacks Competing entities could steal intellectual
property from each other.
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Table 2.2: Android security features
Feature Install-Time Effect Run-Time Effect Required?
Android Notifies users of Protects access to danger- Required to access
Permissions dangerous features
that will be accessed.
Indicates danger-
ous combinations of
conditions.
ous resources by requir-
ing permissions be held
by hardware-requesting
applications.
resources. Optional
to protect application
components.
Intent Filters None Limits scenarios in which
components can be launched.
Optional to protect ap-
plication components.
Component None Declaring components as pri- Optional
Encapsulation vate protects them from unin-
tended access by other appli-
cations.
POSIX Users None Each application runs as a
different user, isolating appli-
cations.
Required
File None Each application has its own Using the private di-
permissions private directory. rectory is optional.
Java language
features
None Type safety and mem-
ory management prevent
memory-level attacks.
Required in SDK.
Virtual machine None Each application runs in its
own VM.
Required
Application
Signing
Unsigned applications
are not allowed in
Android Market.
Signature-level per-
missions are granted
only to applications
created by the same
developer.
Applications with the same
signature can run as the same
user ID.
Required
Mobile car-
rier security
features
None SIM cards are used to iden-
tify and authenticate users,
preventing call theft.
Required if calls will
be made.
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The interplay of various security features can be difficult to understand. Figure 2.1
shows the process of decisions that Android makes when one attempts to start a specific
application. Figure 2.2 shows the decisions made when an application attempts to start
any application that matches specified criteria. Finally, Figure 2.3 shows the process of
resolution when an application attempts to open or save a file. The information in the
figures was not gathered from review of actual Android source code. Rather, it was gained
through understanding documentation in the Android SDK; thus the order in which the
individual checks are presented may not reflect the actual order in which Android performs
the checks.
Figure 2.1: Security decisions encountered if application A attempts to start application B
Of course, there are means to circumvent these security features, and a number of them
focus on the permissions system. One flaw was found in which protection of an appli-
cation with a permission did not protect its components [21]. The authors of [22] found
that permissions that were declared and then granted were not revoked once the original
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Figure 2.2: Security decisions encountered if application A attempts to start any application that
matches specified criteria
14
Figure 2.3: Security decisions encountered if application A attempts to open or save a file
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declaring application was removed. The latter allowed applications to gain permissions to
new applications that were installed later if these new applications declared a permission
with the same name as the previously deleted permission. These two flaws have since been
addressed in Android. The authors also noted the inclusion of arbitrary levels of permis-
sion to denote critical nature (e.g.“normal” compared to “dangerous”), that allow certain
permissions to be hidden from the user upon installation.
Furthermore, applications that are granted dangerous permissions do not need to be
protected by those same permissions, which lets developers create backdoors that can be
opened by other applications. For instance, a malicious developer could create an audio
recording application that has permissions to record audio and write to external storage,
and that is not protected by either of those permissions. A service could be added to the
application that records audio and saves it in a public location with no user notification.
A separate application with permission to access the Internet could launch the service to
record audio and then upload resulting files to the Internet, again with no user notification.
This flaw was addressed by [12], but only by modifying the Android operating system. The
backdoor could be unnecessary as any application with the Internet permission can upload
existing public files to a remote server while the user remains completely unaware.
Defects have also been discovered with the Java Native Interface, such as the vulnera-
bility described in [17] that allowed for binary executables to be included with applications.
These executables could execute dangerous actions on the behalf of unprivileged applica-
tions. The aforementioned vulnerabilities are summarized in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Summary of Android vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Consequences
Include malicious binary as a resource, exe-
cute it via JNI using Android Build System.
System files can be read. On “rooted” de-
vices, ARM instructions and C programs can
be executed.
Protecting entire application with permissions
does not protect its components. The neces-
sary checks are left to the developer. This can
be exploited if memory overflows are possi-
ble and Android Scripting Environment are
present.
Applications with less permissions can access
components of a more privileged application.
Permissions are identified by their names.
Granted permissions were not revoked when
the permissions were deleted, which resulted
in applications maintaining permissions when
the permissions were replaced.
Applications with fewer permissions could
access components of a more privileged ap-
plication.
Normal-level permissions are not shown to
the user.
Permissions can be granted unknowingly.
Permissions with signature-based levels are
not shown to user.
Permissions can be granted unknowingly.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Application
The specific application to demonstrate cloud-smartphone interaction involved ray tracing a
scene and performing image retrieval with the output of the ray tracer. This application was
chosen because of the large amount of processing that was necessary and the size of results,
which the user would likely wish to save to his or her device. Because of these details, the
application benefitted from cloud support, and it required use of several Android and cloud
security mechanisms. The specific application is described below.
1. Ray tracing: ray trace a scene. In this case, the classic Turner Whitted scene described
in [23] was chosen. Advanced features of the ray tracer included rendering images
with variable pixel resolutions, performing rotated-grid supersampling, and rendering
a variable number of objects in the scene.
2. Library compilation: retrieve images from a local cache. This step was done to sim-
plify the implementation, as similar images could be injected into the image library
so a match would always be found. Images could have also been downloaded dynam-
ically from the Web.
3. Image retrieval: compare the ray-traced scene to the images in the image library and
find the closest match via an algorithm [24] provided by OpenCV [25].
Given the description, one could imagine its uses as a real-world solution, as a more
flexible ray tracer would allow users to quickly describe an image or object (without an
image of the actual object required) and find images that match from the Internet. The spe-
cific steps for image retrieval are described below. The actual steps performed are important
because they affect performance.
1. Ray-traced (source) image was loaded as a format that was understood by the OpenCV
library.
2. Images from the image library were loaded one after another. Images were converted
to grayscale and were resized to the pixel resolution of the source image so that the
output of [24] was a single number between -1 and 1, in which a value of 1 indicated
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a perfect match. Then, [24] was used to compare the library images to the source
image.
3. Image resources were freed after the comparison. If a new best image was found, the
filename of the best image was saved to memory.
It should be noted that this method of image retrieval may not have been the most
efficient. Retrieval could possibly have been completed more quickly and more accurately
if, for each comparison, either the source or target image were resized to the pixel resolution
of the smaller image. However, the images from the library were always resized to the pixel
resolution of the ray-traced image. This allowed for more consistent statistics that showed
the effects of pixel resolution even as the images in the library were changed. The code in
the cloud software that performed image retrieval is shown in Appendix A.
3.2 Implementation
The cloud-smartphone system consisted of two distinct parts: a cloud application and an
Android application. A visualization of the entire system architecture is shown in Fig-
ure 3.1. The Android application required two permissions: INTERNET and WRITE
EXTERNAL STORAGE. The application consisted of three main components. A main ac-
tivity was launched initially when the user opened the application. It included options for a
username, a password, and the IP address of the server (described later). An asynchronous
task was included that handled the connection to the cloud and ran in the background while
the application waited for results from the cloud. Finally, a result activity was added that
displayed the result returned from the cloud and it allowed the user to save it to external
storage. Screenshots of the application as it transitioned through each activity are shown in
Figure 3.2.
After the user entered the required information and requested a connection, the applica-
tion sent a request to the cloud for a description of available cloud instances. If an instance
with the expected cloud instance ID and the supplied IP address was found to be running,
the application attempted to connect to it. These steps helped to ensure that connections
were made only with valid servers. The code for the main loop of the Android application,
in which the application authenticated its user with the server, sent its work request to the
cloud, and received an intermediate result, is shown in Appendix D.
Intent filters were defined for each component in the Android application. The main
activity was defined such that it could be launched only from the Android Launcher. The
result activity’s Intent filter allowed it to be launched only with the VIEW action and the
DEFAULT category. Additionally, a data file had to be attached, which was required to
have the MIME type image/png. If the data file was not available or if it could not be
opened as an Android Bitmap object, then the activity did not attempt to open any image.
The asynchronous task executed within the main activity’s process; thus it did not require
an Intent filter. Also, an Intent filter was not necessary for the result activity. If one was
not defined, then the component would not be displayed as an option for generic Intent
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Figure 3.1: CloudSmart system architecture
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requests. However, with the inclusion of the Intent filter, the component was available for
other applications to launch to display images.
The cloud application consisted of two distinct parts: a client (also referred to as a
worker and a worker client in this document), which performed work offloaded to the cloud,
and a server, which managed connections to the cloud and served as an intermediate point
for communication between the end user and worker clients. The server, which was limited
to a single instance in the system, accepted (or rejected) new users and clients, removed
disconnected users and clients, and forwarded communication from users to each client.
The server contained two subcomponents to perform these actions. The server launched
a client handler for each connected worker client. Each of these handlers listened for com-
munication from a single client and sent data to that client. Each handler executed within
its own thread. Similarly, the server launched user handlers for each end user. Each of these
handlers listened for communication from a single end user and sent data to that user. Like
the client handlers, each user handler executed within its own thread. If no worker clients
were connected, the user handler would perform any work offloaded to the cloud.
On the other hand, each worker client would perform any work offloaded to the cloud
by any user. Clients performed their work independently and did not cooperate with each
other. However, each client could be given different data with which to work. In the exam-
ple application, each client could start with a different set of images in its library. After the
completion of its work, each worker sent its results to the server, where the server would
select the best result, save it, and forward it to the end user. The results were saved in case
their transmissions to end users failed. It was important that saved files were managed cor-
rectly. The files always remained private, and they were deleted when they were no longer
needed. The complete source code for the worker client class is shown in Appendix B.
Worker clients did not communicate directly with the end user. The server acted as
an intermediate point for all communication between workers and end users. This design
decision isolated mobile users and worker clients, and it allowed messages to be filtered in
a centralized location before prior to communication with worker clients.
Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) [26] was implemented for the
server to authenticate users and clients when they initially connected to the server. CHAP
was originally designed for use with Point-to-Point Protocol, and it was used in the same
fashion for this project: to authenticate a user with a server in which the systems communi-
cated directly. Two benefits of CHAP are that users’ actual secrets are not sent to the server
and that the protocol resists replay attacks as a unique challenge is sent for each handshake
for use in the one-way hash. Users were identified by a unique username chosen during
registration. Each user’s secret was an SHA-1 hash of his or her password, a string of
human-readable text. SHA-1, which stands for secure hash algorithm 1, was endorsed by
the United States government. The algorithm produces a 160-bit output for any input. The
list of registered users and clients was stored in a text file in a private directory on the server.
A text file was used because of the small number of expected users and clients. A database
could have easily been used in its place. For additional security, the list or database of users
should be encrypted in case the server was compromised.
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Communication between clients, users, and the server was encrypted with 256-bit AES
in CBC mode. AES stands for advanced encryption standard, and, like SHA-1, it is en-
dorsed by the US goverment. The largest key size supported by AES, 256 bits, was used.
CBC, which stands for cipher-block chaining, adds additional complexity because the out-
put for each block depends upon the previous block. OpenSSL [27] was used for the C++
cloud server and client. Android’s implementation of Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
[28] was used in the Android application. Keys were created by the algorithm described
in [29] with an eight-byte salt and the concatenation of each user or client’s username and
hashed password as the key data. This selection of the key data ensured that keys used
for each user would be unqiue. The key data was hashed five times with SHA-1 before its
encryption with 256-bit CBC AES to obtain the key and initialization vector. The CHAP
handshake used a predefined text string as the key data, but all other communication used
the username and password hash string for the key data in order to obtain a unique key
for each user, which prevented one user from deciphering another user’s data. It should be
noted that this method is susceptible to replay attacks; a remedy is explained in the next
section.
An example execution of the application begins with a user’s entering the required
information on the Android interface. The application uses the information to authenticate
itself with the cloud server. Upon successful authentication, the request is sent to the server
at the specified IP address. If successful, the server creates a user handler. The Android
application would then automatically send a work request to be received by the user handler.
If no worker clients are connected, the user handler performs the work for the end user and
immediately returns the result to the end user. Otherwise, the user handler forwards the
request to any connected worker clients via their client handlers. Each client ray traces the
scene and compares its ray-traced image to its library of images. Each comparison yields
a number, referred to as a score, which corresponds to the relation between the ray-traced
and library images. When the image retrieval completes, each worker sends its best score
to the server, which passes the result to the corresponding user handler.
After the reception of each result, the user handler determines if it received enough
results to choose the best one. If enough results have been received, the best one is selected
and its source is noted. Finally, the user handler asks that source for its final result (the best-
matching image, in the example application) and it receives the final result. The server
could operate under two modes. If one more than half of the connected worker clients
returned the same score, the user handler then requests the final result from one of the
clients with that score. If no majority decision was reached, the user handler waits for all
results to arrive and simply chooses the best score (this alone is the second mode). This
code, implemented for the Android application, is shown in Appendix C. To get the best
result, the user handler creates a request and passes it to the server component, which sends
the request to the intended client. The client sends its result back to the server, which passes
the result to the user handler, which saves the file to a private directory. This program flow
as seen from the Android interface is shown in Figure 3.2.
For further protection, the file should be encrypted. If a worker client disconnects after
it was asked for its best result, the client is ignored, the best score is determined again, and
the next best client is asked for its result. This process is repeated until a result is returned or
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Figure 3.2: Screenshots of the Android interface as the program transitioned through three phases
of execution. Th application began in an idle state waiting for information on the cloud from the
user (left). After the user pressed the button, the work request was delivered, and the interface was
updated accordingly (center). The application stayed in this state until the final result was received,
at which point it was displayed (right).
until no clients are connected, at which point the user handler performs the work itself. The
specific implementation of this feature was not perfect, and, under certain circumstances,
the user handler would wait forever for a disconnected client to return a result. To combat
this possibility, a reliable, low-cost watchdog as proposed in [30] and [31] could have been
used to update client statuses and ensure result delivery.
As worker clients handled work for multiple users, it was necessary to ensure that users
could not retrieve other users’ results. Thus, each result was saved along with the ID of
the user that requested it. IDs were managed only on the server. Additionally, clients com-
municated only with the server and did not accept any other incoming traffic. These two
items combined with the authentication protocol ensured that no user could masquerade as
another user to steal his or her results.
When the user received his or her result on his or her mobile device, the result was
saved to the application’s private storage folder. This protected the file from access by
other applications that otherwise could upload the file to a server. An export option was
available in the result activity that allowed a user to save results to external storage, where
the files would be public and available to all applications on the device. Under normal
circumstances, the application’s private directory remains inaccessible even to the owner
of the device. However, this is not the case on “rooted” devices. Thus, for additional
security, files should be encrypted when saved to the private directory. However, it was
not an option to save an encrypted file: if the application were uninstalled or the file were
removed from the external storage, then the file would become unusable.
An additional configuration of the cloud software was authored in which the system was
restructured to contain multiple servers on the cloud to which the mobile user connected.
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Each server performed any work offloaded to it. In this scenario, no cloud instance chose
a best result; rather, the mobile user received each intermediate result. In the application
presented in the paper, these were the scores that corresponded to an image’s similarity to
the ray-traced image. From these intermediate results, the application on the mobile user’s
device could choose the best result. The advantage with this configuration was that the
redundancy allowed the application to ignore artificial results. This version also circum-
vented the server in its usual role, which was a single point of failure if compomised.
3.3 Security features
With the Android application and cloud software developed, the system needed to be se-
cured. This process required a selection of vulnerabilities to address. The most obvious
choice of vulnerabilities to address included those that could be solved merely with design
choices. This selection included basic methods to secure private data and to ensure ex-
pected operation. For instance, when saving a file to a directory, a handle to that directory
must be opened. The design choice is whether it is better to save to a public directory or
to a private directory. The next step in selecting security features was to select features
that needed to be implemented, or those features that required more effort than simple de-
sign decisions. It was decided that these features should impact the same vulnerabilities
addressed in the previous step. Of course, there were countless options for this stage of ac-
tion, but several options could be considered obvious, such as the need for encryption and
authentication. No effort was placed on patching exploits; even as one exploit is patched,
many more exploits will be discovered, and the technologies in use will become obsolete.
Rather, effort was placed on defining a secure foundation upon which future work can build.
Certain vulnerabilities described in related work influenced the selection of vulnerabilties
addressed in this work. These issues are summarized in Table 3.1.
A number of best practices were determined from this project’s implementation. Cer-
tain practices are specific to Android. All private information including personal files and
account data should be saved in private directories to protect it from rogue applications. An-
droid provides Context.openFileOutput(String, int) [32], which opens a handle to a private
directory. As previously detailed, files saved in private directories may not remain private
if a device is “rooted.” Thus, private files should be encrypted when saved, including any
credentials, such as passwords and cloud credentials. For encryption, AES has been proven
to be resilient against attacks [33]. Data sent over the air should be encrypted as well, as
encryption is not performed automatically. Along with AES, RSA is a suitable candidate
for these applications [34]. As part of CloudSmart, files were not encrypted when saved,
but all communication was encrypted.
Android activities and services can return results; however, results may not be computed
properly, and applications can crash if they use such results. Thus, applications should al-
ways check the resultCode value returned by an activity [35]. Similarly, return values
of function calls should be checked, like the values returned by Intent.getData() [36], In-
tent.getStringExtra(String) [37], and BitmapFactory.decodeFile(String) [38]. No activities
were used to return results, but all function return values were checked in CloudSmart.
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Table 3.1: Known vulnerabilities addressed in this work
Specific Vulnerability Actions Taken to Address
Web browsers lack support for XML Signa-
ture and XML Encryption, allowing creden-
tials can be moved from one machine to an-
other to appear as a different user.
Save files to private storage [32].
Cloud Malware Injection Attack Use multiple instance to provide redundancy
[40] and avoid single points of failure.
Developers cannot enforce that called appli-
cations hold or do not hold certain permis-
sion. Similarly, developers cannot ensure that
launched applications will not handle sup-
plied data maliciously [46] [11].
Remain open issues. Can mitigate by call-
ing applications my name only and refrain-
ing from passing sensitive data betwen apli-
cations.
Applications that hold dangerous permissions
can create backdoors for unprivileged appli-
cations [12].
Remains an open issue.
Regarding interactions between applications, permissions [19] should be required where
necessary. These are used to notify users of applications that may perform dangerous ac-
tions. No permissions were required for this project as no public components performed
dangerous actions. Also, meaningful Intent filters [20] should be defined for all public
components. Intent filters limit the ways in which activities and services can be launched.
The Intent filters created in this project were described in the pervious section.
Other practices relate to overall systems. Secure authentication methods should be used
for systems in which multiple users must be remembered by the system. Such systems
should be resistant to many different attacks and help to secure users’ privacy. The project
described here used the protocol described in [26]. TLS [39] should be used to authenticate
any servers, which allows users to be confident that they connect to the correct servers. TLS
was not implemented for this project as the expected complexity of implementation was
thought to be quite high. Finally, if instances are compromised or malicious instances are
inserted into a system, they can send invalid results to users. Thus, multiple clients should
be used to provide redundancy to confirm results as in [40]. For the same purposes and also
for reliability, single points of failure should be avoided. Redundancy was accomplished in
CloudSmart with the additional feature of the software that allowed the Android application
to select the best result from multiple servers.
A number of security features were proposed for this thesis. It is very important that
private information is not recorded with logging functions. In general, before an application
is released to the market, all logging should be disabled [41]. However, it is very important
that all calls to logging functions containing private information such as user accounts,
names, and passwords be removed as any application with the READ LOGS permission
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can execute Android’s LogCat program like a shell script with the RunTime class [42]. In
this project, all logging was disabled in versions distributed to other users.
Additionally, it is proposed that data should initially be saved to private directories
with the option provided to users to export their data to public directories, such as external
storage. It is wise to add this option as users may wish for personal data, such as audio
recordings and pictures, to remain private to the application that created it. The extra option
is especially beneficial if rogue applications are present on users’ devices. Also, as the user
is unaware of most functions by default, users should be notified of any important events,
such as saving data to public directories and uploading or downloading files to or from the
Internet. Android provides the Toast class [43], which is an option for quick notifications
that was used in CloudSmart.
Finally, cloud commands such as euca-describe-instances [44] and ec2-describe-instances
[45] can be used to verify instances on which servers reside. These functions are benefi-
cial because every cloud instance on which servers reside has an image ID and an instance
ID. The instance ID for each server in a system may change, but its image ID will not
change. Thus, if a server’s image ID (or possibly its instance ID, depending on the system)
is different than expected, then the user should ignore the server. While these methods
can be useful, TLS remains an Internet standard as it has been proven to be effective. In
CloudSmart, the euca-describe-instances command was used to validate instances.
Larger security gaps exist as well. One such vulnerability is that developers and users
cannot prevent other applications from uploading public files to remote servers. This is a
concern especially on Android devices, in which private files, such as photographs and au-
dio recordings, are very likely to be present and saved in predictable locations. A number
of issues contribute to this vulnerability. It is not possible to ensure that launched applica-
tions will not handle supplied data maliciously, such as saving data to public locations or
calling other applications to handle data. Similarly, developers cannot enforce that called
applications hold or do not hold certain permissions [46]. For instance, an application that
passes its data to an unspecified third-party application cannot ensure that the application
does not hold the INTERNET permission, which would allow the application to upload the
data anywhere. This vulnerability was addressed with Saint [11], but its solution requires
modifications to Android that have not yet been implemented. One suggestion is that only
trusted applications should be called. Finally, files saved in public locations can be silently
uploaded by any application with the INTERNET permission. There is currently no method
to avoid this vulnerability short of saving data to private directories, but private directories
prevent users from accessing the data without the application that saved it. The previous
suggestion to save data to private directories initially while allowing users to export their
data to external storage may be helpful here. If files are saved to public directories by
default, it is recommended that obvious naming schemes for such files are avoided.
An interesting vulnerability that is difficult to solve is also related to Android: open-
ing files from remote clients can be potentially dangerous. Even if files are not dangerous
to Android devices, they can be dangerous if sent to PC users. One possible solution is
to scan files for viruses. However, no popular antivirus application’s public documenta-
tion suggests it can scan specific files on-demand. Even if an application supported that
functionality, the antivirus application could not access private files to scan them under
26
Android’s security model. Thus, the only real solution is to build antivirus features into an
application. However, this adds to the size of applications, and it increases the overhead
for developers as they would need to integrate antivirus frameworks into their applications.
An interesting solution is to avoid local antivirus checks and offload this work to the cloud.
Applications that hold dangerous permissions can create backdoors for unprivileged
applications. This vulnerability undermines the permissions system in that even if an ap-
plication requires that calling applications hold certain permissions, an application that
holds those permissions can create activities and services that can be called by other ap-
plications with no permissions. This vulnerability was addressed by Kirin [12], but that
project required modifications to Android that have not been implemented. A solution that
can be employed by an developer for his or her applications has yet to be introduced.
Data received over the air can crash applications if they are invalid. As previously men-
tioned, return values of functions should be checked. In addition, Android offers features
that can be used to validate input, such as the InputFilter interface [47] and the inputType
attribute [48]. However, these options are for user-interface fields only. Data validation
frameworks exist for Java and C, but no such framework is targeted specifically to Android.
The vulnerabilities and recommended practices described in this section are summarized
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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Table 3.2: Summary of vulnerabilities encountered through development of this project.
Vulnerability Solutions Open Issues
Any public file can be silently
uploaded to remote servers by
any application with the INTER-
NET permission.
Save files to private storage [32]. No solution for public
files.
Cannot ensure that launched ap-
plications will not handle sup-
plied data maliciously.
Saint [11], but it is not imple-
mented in Android. Can miti-
gate by calling applications by
name only and refraining from
passing sensitive data betwen
aplications.
No current method to
limit called application
privileges.
Developers cannot enforce that
called applications hold or do
not hold certain permissions [46]
[11].
Saint [11], but it is not imple-
mented in Android. Can miti-
gate by calling applications by
name only and refraining from
passing sensitive data betwen
aplications.
No method to limit called
application privileges.
Opening files from remote
clients can be dangerous.
Build antivirus functionality into
an application.
Building antivirus func-
tionality into each ap-
plication creates unneces-
sary complexity.
Applications that hold danger-
ous permissions can create back-
doors for unprivileged applica-
tions.
Kirin [12], but it is not imple-
mented in Android.
No current method to pre-
vent such backdoors.
Invalid data can crash applica-
tions.
ResultCode should always be
checked for activities that return
results [35]. Function return val-
ues as with [36], [37], and [38]
should always be checked. An-
droid provides IntentFilter [47]
and inputType.
IntentFilter and inputType
[48] are useful for UI
fields only. No data
validation frameworks
are targeted specifically
to Android.
Files saved in private directories
may not remain private if a de-
vice is “rooted.”
Encryption such as AES can be
used [33].
None.
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Table 3.3: Summary of vulnerabilities encountered through development of this project (continued).
Vulnerability Solutions Open Issues
Access to dangerous features
needs to be protected.
Android permissions system
[19] should be used.
Applications that hold
permissions can create
backdoors (see above).
Access to public application
components needs to be limited.
Android provides Intent filters
[20].
None.
There is no automatic notifica-
tion of important actions such as
uploading files or saving files to
public locations.
Toasts [43] are convenient and
simple.
None.
Personal information can be read
in system logs by other applica-
tions and users.
Disable logging prior to applica-
tion release [41].
None.
Data in systems with multiple
users needs to be kept private.
Use an authentication system
that is resistant to various types
of attacks such as CHAP [26].
None.
Server identities need to be veri-
fied.
TLS can be used to verify
servers [39]. Cloud commands
like [44] and [45] can be helpful.
Vulnerabilities are present
within TLS.
Invalid cloud instances can poi-
son results.
Use multiple instance to provide
redundancy [40]. Avoid single
points of failure.
None.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation
4.1 Experiments
Performance of the developed software was evaluated with regard to execution time, battery
usage, and memory usage. An Android application was developed as a foil to the cloud-
supported software, and its performance was evaluated in the same areas as the cloud-
supported application in order to provide a baseline for performance. It performed the
ray tracing and image retrieval tasks using the same algorithms that the cloud-supported
application performed, but with only the mobile device for processing. The application’s
library of images for image retrieval was located on the smartphone’s external storage.
To measure execution time and memory usage, at least ten trial executions of the ap-
plications were completed. Execution time was measured as the delay between the trans-
mission of the initial request to offload work and the reception of the final result by using
Android’s SystemClock.elapsedRealtime() function.
Android offers many methods by which memory usage can be measured. Multiple
methods are available via the LogCat function of the Android Debug Bridge. Android also
maintains a file available in the proc filesystem. Programmatically, a MemoryInfo object
can be obtained by an application by calling the ActivityManager.getProcessMemoryInfo(int[])
function, which allows the application to survey its memory usage. The MemoryInfo ob-
ject contains three metrics: shared dirty pages, private dirty pages, and proportional set size.
Each metric was available for dalvik (Android’s process virtual machine, which is simalar
to a Java virtual machine), the native heap, and “everything else” (other) [49]. Shared dirty
pages was ignored because of the indication that it accounted for memory shared between
several applications. Thus, the private dirty pages and proportional set size metrics were
recorded. For each metric, the dalvik, native, and other values were summed. Figure 4.1
shows average memory consumption for ten trials of the local-processing application for
both separate parts of the execution. Clearly, there was a correlation between the metrics,
and this trend was present on all subsequent trials. Because of this trend, only the private
dirty pages metric was used to compare memory usage for all tests. Memory was measured
throughout the applications’ executions by obtaining MemoryInfo objects at various points
during the executions.
A curiosity with memory usage is shown in Figure 4.2, which shows the full memory
statistics for a single execution of the local-processing application. The level part of the
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Figure 4.1: Average memory usage in the local-processing application over ten executions with 118
images and 800x600 ray-traced images. RT indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR
indicates image retrieval.
chart shows the memory usage for the ray tracing portion of the execution. As the image
retrieval portion began, the memory usage began to rise to more than double the mem-
ory usage of the first part of the application. This behavior was found on all tests of the
local-processing application. With larger images, the application crashed during the second
phase. Although exhaustive attempts were made to manage memory better, but the trend
remained.
Battery usage was measured through creating a BroadcastReceiver for Android’s Bat-
teryManager. It was discovered that battery level was reported with very coarse granularity:
0 to 100 % at 10 % increments. Because of this, it was very difficult to record accurate bat-
tery statistics. To combat the coarse granularity, enough trials of each application were run
such that battery level decreased by 20 % of the full scale. This decrease was achieved in
order to obtain a more accurate representation of battery usage, as it was assumed that when
the battery dropped to the next lowest level, it was exactly at that level (e.g. if the battery
level decreased from 90 % to 80 %, the battery life was assumed to be exactly 80 % of the
full scale). Additionally, as many background services as possible, such as WiFi, GPS, and
data syncing, were disabled while running the applications. Because percentage of battery
life depends on the specific battery used, the percentages of battery life were multiplied by
the Watt-hour (Wh) rating listed on the battery.
The issue with Android’s coarse granularity for battery usage is exemplified in Fig-
ure 4.3, which shows the average reported battery level from several executions of the
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Figure 4.2: Memory statistics from one representative execution of the local-processing application
with 118 images and 800x600 ray-traced images.
local-processing application. The chart illustrates the issues posed by the collection of bat-
tery information. For several executions of the application, the reported battery level did
not change. Rather than decreasing smoothly over a number of trials, the coarse granularity
in which battery level was measured indicated that battery level dropped 10 % only during
specific executions.
Each performance metric was measured on both the cloud-supported and local-processing
applications. Two varibles were present in these measurements: the number of images in
library (that were compared to the ray-traced image) and the pixel resolution of the ray-
traced image. Changes to the number of images did not affect the ray tracing portion of the
execution, but differences in the ray-traced image’s pixel resolution affected both parts of
the application as the images in the library were resized to the dimensions of the ray-traced
image. Finally, the measurements were also obtained from the cloud-supported application
without the encryption and authentication features in place and from the software with the
feature enabled in which results were selected locally.
4.2 Test setup
Results were obtained on a Motorola Droid X on which Motorola’s official Android 2.3.3
firmware [50] was installed. The approximate capacity of the device’s battery was 5.7 Wh.
Amazon’s Amazon Web Services Android SDK [51] was used to provide cloud commands
for the Android application. The cloud that was used ran Eucalyptus 2.0.3 [52] on CentOS
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Figure 4.3: Average reported battery level over several consecutive executions of the local-
processing application with 118 images and 800x600 ray-traced images.
5.6 and included three Intel quad-core machines, one of which (the front-end) hosted the
cloud controller, Walrus, cluster controller, and storage controller. The other two machines
were node controllers. Because of limitations imposed by the campus network, the front-
end machine was connected to a router in order to allow IP addresses on the same subnet
as the front-end machine to be assigned via DHCP to end users. End users were required
to connect to a wireless network hosted by the router. The node controllers and front-end
were connected via a private switch that was not connected to the Internet. This config-
uration, shown in Figure 4.4, supported Eucalyptus’s managed networking mode, which
was used because it offered the highest degree of virtual-machine isolation. However, any
networking mode could have been used.
For image processing, OpenCV 1.1 was used in the cloud-supported application. This
older version because the cloud images’ host operating system was CentOS 5.3, which
supported only up to OpenCV 1.1. The local-processing application used OpenCV 2.3 for
image processing [25].
Measurements were taken only on the Android devices because the goal was to ana-
lyze performance on the smartphones and the effects of offloading work to the cloud. No
statistics were recorded on the cloud.
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Figure 4.4: Network architecture of the cloud [4]. The listed IP addresses are example addresses
and not the actual addresses used in the system.
4.3 Results
It was determined that current Android smartphones cannot support resource-intensive ap-
plications such as the one studied in this thesis. While there is no time limit to the run-time
of an application, there are certainly limitations to how long users will wait for results.
On average, the local-processing application’s execution time was much longer than that
of the cloud-supported application. The average execution time for the tests on the cloud-
supported application did not exceed 22 seconds. On the other hand, the local-processing
application consumed 7 minutes on average for the heaviest workload issued during testing.
While execution time increased roughly linearly with respect to pixel resolution of the
ray-traced image and with respect to the number of images to which the ray-traced im-
age was compared, it was found that execution time of the local-processing application
increases much more quickly than the cloud-supported application as the workload grows.
As the number of images in the comparison library was varied, the slope of the local-
processing application’s execution time was 1.04, while that of the cloud-supported appli-
cation was 0.06. As the pixel resolution of the ray-traced image was varied, the slope of
the local-processing application’s execution time was 3.92×10−4, while that of the cloud-
supported application was 1.89×10−5. These results are shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
Current Android smartphones require too much battery power to support applications
like the one described in this paper. Each execution of the local-processing application with
1200-px by 900-px images used on average 0.143 Watt-hours (Wh) per execution (single
ray tracing and image retrieval). At this rate, the application could be run 40 times from
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Figure 4.5: Average execution time in the local-processing application and the cloud-supported
application over ten or more executions with 800x600 ray-traced images and a varying number of
library images. RT indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR indicates image retrieval.
Figure 4.6: Average execution time in the local-processing application and the cloud-supported
application over ten or more executions with 118 library images and a varying pixel resolution. RT
indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR indicates image retrieval.
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a full charge until the entire battery power was exhausted. Most users would not want to
run the application 40 times over a single charge, but even two to three times could reduce
the battery life by a half hour. On the other hand, the cloud-supported application required
at most 0.010 Wh, or 7 % of the highest battery usage of the local-processing application.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the battery usage results.
Figure 4.7: Average battery usage per execution in the local-processing application and the cloud-
supported application over ten or more executions with 800x600 ray-traced images and a varying
number of library images. RT indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR indicates
image retrieval.
Finally, current Android smartphones cannot support the memory (RAM) requirements
of resource-intensive applications like the one described in this thesis. Frequently, the
local-processing application crashed while ray tracing large images or while performing
image retrieval on large images (1600 px by 1200 px and larger). The issues with crashes
during the image retrieval phase were more severe and noticeable on images that even
the ray-tracing portion could handle. The issues with memory consumption of the image
retrieval phase might be addressed in future versions of the OpenCV image library. On the
other hand, the limitations of the ray-tracing phase can be overcome only by increasing the
memory that can be reserved by applications.
Average memory consumption did not increase as dramatically as execution time when
workloads were increased. Interestingly, higher memory consumption was reported when
the comparison library contained fewer images than when the amount was increased. This
anomaly could be due to garbage collection, which perhaps did not run as aggressively as
when the memory requirements were more intense. Still, the average memory consumption
for the cloud-supported application was much lower than the local-processing application;
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Figure 4.8: Average battery usage per execution in the local-processing application and the cloud-
supported application over ten or more executions with 118 library images and a varying pixel
resolutions. RT indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR indicates image retrieval.
it required only between 6 and slightly over 7 MB of memory. On the other hand, average
memory consumption for the image retrieval portion of the local-processing application
reached 40 MB, and it was frequently between 30 MB and 35 MB. Average memory usage
results are shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.10.
While the pixel resolution of the ray-traced image was varied in the tests performed,
the complexity of the ray-traced image was not changed in any test as the contents of the
ray-traced scene remained unchanged. Image complexity was not included as a variable
because it was not expected to affect results. Figure 4.11 shows a comparison of aver-
age execution time of the cloud-supported application with varied image complexity. As
shown, the difference between the ray-tracing and total execution times changed mini-
mally as the number of objects in the rendered scene was varied from 3 to 50 objects. The
time required for ray tracing was obtained by executing the ray tracer independently of the
cloud-supported application. Another caveat is that the object placement was static for the
first three objects placed in the scene; additional objects added to the scene were placed at
random locations. Also, as the image complexity was increased, the template matching al-
gorithm had a tendency to suggest that the smaller 7-KB to 15-KB images from the Caltech
101 library were the best matches, rather than the extra ray-traced images, which were ap-
proximately 70 KB in size. These details could have contributed to the small discrepancies
in the differences between execution times.
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Figure 4.9: Average memory usage in the local-processing application and the cloud-supported
application over ten or more executions with 800x600 ray-traced images and a varying number of
library images. RT indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR indicates image retrieval.
Figure 4.10: Average memory usage in the local-processing application and the cloud-supported
application over ten or more executions with 118 library images and a varying pixel resolutions. RT
indicates the ray-tracing portion of execution while IR indicates image retrieval.
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To summarize the results presented thus far, it is fair to state that image complexity has
little impact on the three metrics studied. It does affect ray tracing, however. Pixel reso-
lution can affect both phases of execution, while the images within the comparison library
have no effect on ray tracing. In the tests performed, battery usage and memory usage were
affected most heavily by the pixel resolutions of images. On the other hand, execution time
appeared to be most strongly affected by the number of images in the comparison library.
However, the highest number of images included in the comparison library was 218 images
in the tests performed. In a real-world application, the user would likely want the source
image compared to thousands or millions of images, rather than to a few very large images.
Thus, it would be very important to limit pixel resolution to the smallest resolution that
returned the best results most efficiently.
Figure 4.11: Average execution time in the local-processing application with 118 library images
and 800x600 ray-traced images compared to the average time required for ray tracing (denoted by
“RT”) and the difference between the two times. The number of objects placed in the scene was
varied.
The impacts of additional security features were measured together and were deter-
mined to be negligible. Android-specific features such as saving files to private locations,
requiring permissions, and defining Intent Filters impose no noticeable overhead. Thus, the
cloud-supported application was tested both with encryption and the authentication system
and without those features. The difference in average memory consumption was less than
1 MB. According to the execution time statistics, the application with authentication and
encryption performed over one second faster. However, both times are within range of each
other, accounting for the standard deviations. Table 4.1 summarizes the results.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of cloud-supported applications by security features (118 800-px by 600-px
images)
With Encryption Without Encryption Best Result
and Authentication and Authentication Chosen Locally
Average Execution Time (s) 7.78300±0.30332 8.82592±0.96071 8.82517±0.49934
Average Battery Usage (Wh) 0.00413 0.00408 0.00424
Average Memory Usage (MB) 6.29185±0.81932 5.84003±1.21431 6.11826±0.94881
The additional configuration in which the application on the mobile device received in-
termediate results and selected the best result was also tested. This testing was performed
with three servers on the cloud to which work was offloaded. Intermediate results were
required only from one more than half of the servers (two, in this case) if the results were
the same. Otherwise, the user’s application waited for the results from all of the servers
and chose the best result. With regard to execution time, this configuration of the appli-
cation performed slightly slower than the other configuration. This is a logical result as
sending intermediate results to users and receiving users’ requests for final results added an
extra overhead. Battery usage and memory usage were on par with the other cases. Given
these results, this configuration was perhaps the best configuration tested in this project,
as the security of authentication and encryption were maintained in addition to the pro-
vided redundancy. However, this scenario required communication with additional servers.
Table 4.1 summarizes these results as well.
The effects of background traffic were studied. In a real-world situation, traffic in ad-
dition to the communication for a single user would exist, perhaps in the forms of commu-
nication with other users and traffic from other applications on the same network. Traffic
was modeled by a simple exchange of a string between a user and a worker client repeated
over a periodic interval. The worker client would copy and reverse the string a number of
times until the message it had to send back to the user was up to 1024 bytes. Only results
for execution time are shown. Battery usage and memory usage statistics were similar for
each scenario.
It was found that the cloud software could withstand traffic of up to slightly over
20 KB/s per worker client (that figure represented the data sent from the worker clients).
Faster transmission rates resulted in crashes of the user clients that generated traffic as send
and receive buffers overflowed. Such crashes indicates that the cloud software would need
to be refactored in order to withstand excessive traffic if the software were released as a pro-
duction system. However, it was still true that the existing system could handle a number
of users simultaneously, as the chances of many users (on the given system with the net-
work architecture used during testing) simultaneously requesting offloaded work was quite
unlikely. Requests for work were short, only on the order of bytes for a single request; thus
many requests could be saved to a buffer without interruption of the software. The results
from which these conclusions were drawn are shown in Figure 4.12. The corresponding
traffic transmission rates for each scenario are shown in Figure 4.13.
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The results shown in Figure 4.12 confirm that background traffic descreases perfor-
mance. However, the descrease was only slight, on the order of 10 to 20 ms. An interesting
outcome was that the case of all clients performing work with background traffic required
slightly less time than the case of any single available client performing work. On the other
hand, these values are well within range of each other when their standard deviations are
taken into account.
Figure 4.12: Average execution time in the local-processing application over ten or more executions
with 800x600 ray-traced images and 118 library images. The amount of background traffic was
varied.
One remaining question involves the effects of network latency on the system in a real-
world application. For the testing performed, the front-end cloud node was behind a wire-
less router and the other nodes were connected to it via a gigabit switch. Meanwhile, the
Android smartphone connected directly to the wireless network broadcast by the router. In
a real-world setup, much more complicated routing would need to take place between the
phone and the cloud.
It is believed that the communication between the cloud and the smartphone and its
delay would be comparable to that of loading a Web page on a mobile device. Only two
transmissions are made between the cloud and the smartphone. The initial authentication
and work request messages are short (no more than a kilobyte). The remaining communi-
cation is the transmission of the final result, which in the cases tested is an image, such as
the many images present on popular Web sites.
Network delay could also be an issue on the cloud side. It is possible that slower
switches would be used or the route could be much more complicated. However, few cloud
instances are required, and they could easily execute in the same datacenter. They could
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Figure 4.13: Average rates of transmission for data received by user applications that emulated
background traffic. Each case corresponds to a result shown in Figure 4.12.
execute in virtual machines on the same physical machine, but this may be less likely as
a goal of the cloud is to distribute load evenly. Additionally, there is not a great amount
of communication between cloud nodes. A small amount of data (less than a kilobyte) is
sent between nodes for the purposes of authentication, requests for work from clients, and
transmission of initial results. Only one client returns its larger final result, an image in this
case. Again, it is unlikely that the delay in the exchange of these data would exceed the
delay present in the download of a Web page from a mobile device.
A summary of the effects on performance is divided into two sections: effects on the
different phases of execution and effects on performance metrics. The effects on the ray
tracing and image retrieval phases are recorded in Table 4.2. Pixel resolution of images
affects both phases, while the number of images in the library affected image retrieval
performance, and variations in image complexity affected only ray tracing. Effects on each
performance metric are summarized in Table 4.3. It was diffcult to name a single variable as
having the greatest effect on each metric, but analyzing the slopes of recorded data revealed
trends. Execution time was most affected by the number of images in the image library,
whereas pixel resolution of the ray-traced images and images in the library affected battery
usage and memory usage most greatly. This conclusion is logical as higher resolution
images require more memory, which leads to higher battery usage. However, if the example
application were implemented as a real-world application, it would be very important to
find the pixel resolution that achieved the best balance of efficiency and accuracy. It would
also be important to maximize the number of images in the comparison library so that well
matching images could be found in many cases.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of effects on phases of execution (↑ denotes an impact, and↔ denotes no
impact)
Number of Pixel Resolution Image Background
Images in Library of Images Complexity Traffic
Ray Tracing ↔ ↑ ↑ ↔
Image Retrieval ↑ ↑ ↔ ↔
Table 4.3: Comparison of effects of performance metrics (↑ denotes the most impact, ↗ denotes
some impact, and↔ denotes no impact)
Number of Pixel Resolution Image Background
Images in Library of Images Complexity Traffic
Execution Time ↑ ↗ ↗ ↗
Battery Usage ↗ ↑ ↗ ↗
Memory Usage ↗ ↑ ↔ ↔
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Cloud usage and smartphone usage continue to grow. Meanwhile, smartphone performance
increases, and the devices become ever more connected, opening smartphones to a host of
new applications once impossible on mobile devices. However, smartphones still suffer
with regard to battery life. Thus, the incentives and ability to offload smartphone tasks to
the cloud are greater than ever. However, many questions about the security of this marriage
are unanswered while the number of malicious smartphone applications have climbed. The
work presented in this thesis is among the first specifically to address security issues of
interaction between smartphones and the cloud. This work focused on integrating vulner-
abilities from a number of sources rather than discovering new issues. Most attention was
placed on issues in the Android operating system.
The research presented is the first in this area to analyze the security of cloud-smartphone
interaction. A simple but realistic system that offloaded a single task, ray tracing with image
retrieval, to a cloud was designed and implemented. Future work will concentrate on ex-
tending the system to generalize it and allow it to offload a variety of commonly-performed
smartphone functions.
An application that performed the same functionality locally on the Android device
was also created for the purpose of comparison to the cloud-supported application. It was
found that the cloud-supported application completed the task with very little impact on
the Android device, and it was capable of much larger workloads than those used during
testing. On the other hand, the application that used only local processing required several
minutes for a single task and operated at its limits when faced with the tasks performed
during testing.
Possible future work includes the development of solutions of a number of Android-
related vulnerabilities, including the implementation of tighter controls on access to public
files, fixes to the loopholes and inadequacies in the permissions system, and possibly the
creation of a data validation framework for Android. A major issue that needs to be ad-
dressed is the ability for any application to scan private files for viruses.
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Appendix A
Image retrieval source
/∗
∗ t e m p l a t e s . cpp
∗ Image r e t r i e v a l code
∗ Author : Corey A . Beres ( cab3674@ri t . edu )
∗ /
# i f d e f OPENCV2
# inc lude ” opencv2 / imgproc / imgproc . hpp ”
# inc lude ” opencv2 / c o r e / c o r e . hpp ”
# inc lude ” opencv2 / h i g h g u i / h i g h g u i . hpp ”
# e l s e
# in c lude ” opencv / cv . h ”
# inc lude ” opencv / h i g h g u i . h ”
# end i f
# in c lude <s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <u n i s t d . h>
# inc lude <d i r e n t . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
# inc lude <s y s / s t a t . h>
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude ” S e r v e r . h ”
us ing namespace s t d ;
# i f d e f OPENCV2
us ing namespace cv ;
# end i f
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# de f i n e MAX BYTES 256
char myBestImage [MAX BYTES ] ;
/ / S e t s t h e pa th o f t h e b e s t image t o t h e g i v e n char ∗
void g e t B e s t I m a g e P a t h ( char ∗ bes t Image , i n t maxCopyBytes ) {
i n t s t r i n g S i z e = MAX BYTES − 1 ;
i f ( maxCopyBytes < s t r i n g S i z e ) {
s t r i n g S i z e = maxCopyBytes − 1 ;
}
s t r n c p y ( bes t Image , myBestImage , s t r i n g S i z e ) ;
b e s t I m a g e [ s t r i n g S i z e ] = ’\0 ’ ;
}
# i f d e f OPENCV2
/ / Per forms t e m p l a t e match ing on t h e images i n t h e t a r g e t F o l d e r t o t h e source Image
/ / OpenCV 2 v e r s i o n
f l o a t g e t B e s t M a t c h ( cons t char ∗ sourceImage , cons t char ∗ t a r g e t F o l d e r ) {
/ / Source image
I p l I m a g e ∗ i m g s r c = cvLoadImage ( sourceImage , CV LOAD IMAGE GRAYSCALE ) ;
Mat s o u r c e ( img s rc , f a l s e ) ;
/ / C u r r e n t t a r g e t image
I p l I m a g e ∗ i m g t a r g ;
Mat t a r g e t ;
/ / For r e s u l t s
f l o a t b e s t S c o r e = −2; / / I n i t i a l i z e t o −2 ( l e s s than min s c o r e o f −1.0)
f l o a t t empScore ;
Mat r e s u l t ;
/ / F i l e s t u f f
DIR ∗dp ;
char homeDir [ 2 5 6 ] ;
getcwd ( homeDir , 2 5 6 ) ;
s t r u c t d i r e n t ∗ e n t r y ;
s t r u c t s t a t s t a t b u f ;
/ / I t e r a t e t h r o u g h images i n s p e c i f i e d f o l d e r
i f ( ( dp = o p e n d i r ( t a r g e t F o l d e r ) ) == NULL) {
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , ” c a n n o t open d i r e c t o r y : %s\n ” , t a r g e t F o l d e r ) ;
}
c h d i r ( t a r g e t F o l d e r ) ;
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whi le ( ( e n t r y = r e a d d i r ( dp ) ) != NULL) {
l s t a t ( e n t r y−>d name , &s t a t b u f ) ;
i f ( ! S ISDIR ( s t a t b u f . s t mode ) ) {
/ / F i l e , n o t a d i r e c t o r y
/ / Open image and r e s i z e i t t o s o u r c e s i z e
i m g t a r g = cvLoadImage ( e n t r y−>d name , CV LOAD IMAGE GRAYSCALE ) ;
Mat t a r g e t o r i g ( i m g t a r g , f a l s e ) ;
r e s i z e ( t a r g e t o r i g , t a r g e t , s o u r c e . s i z e ( ) , 0 , 0 , INTER CUBIC ) ;
/ / R e l e a s e r e s o u r c e s
t a r g e t o r i g . r e l e a s e ( ) ;
cvRe lea se Image (& i m g t a r g ) ;
/ / Compare i t t o t h e s o u r c e image
matchTempla te ( t a r g e t , sou rce , r e s u l t , CV TM CCOEFF NORMED ) ;
tempScore = r e s u l t . a t<f l o a t >(0 , 0 ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Bes t s c o r e was %f ; %s s c o r e i s %f \n ” , b e s t S c o r e ,
e n t r y−>d name , r e s u l t . a t<f l o a t >(0 , 0 ) ) ;
/ / Check compar i son r e s u l t s
i f ( tempScore > b e s t S c o r e ) {
b e s t S c o r e = tempScore ;
s p r i n t f ( myBestImage , ”%s /% s ” , t a r g e t F o l d e r , e n t r y−>d name ) ;
}
}
}
/ / R e l e a s e m a t r i x r e s o u r c e s
s o u r c e . r e l e a s e ( ) ;
t a r g e t . r e l e a s e ( ) ;
r e s u l t . r e l e a s e ( ) ;
/ / R e l e a s e t h e image r e s o u r c e s
cvRe lease Image (& i m g s r c ) ;
c l o s e d i r ( dp ) ;
c h d i r ( homeDir ) ; / / back t o our i n i t i a l d i r e c t o r y
re turn b e s t S c o r e ;
}
# e l s e
/ / Per forms t e m p l a t e match ing on t h e images i n t h e t a r g e t F o l d e r t o t h e source Image
/ / OpenCV 1 v e r s i o n
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f l o a t g e t B e s t M a t c h ( cons t char ∗ sourceImage , cons t char ∗ t a r g e t F o l d e r ) {
/ / Source image
I p l I m a g e ∗ i m g s r c ;
/ / C u r r e n t t a r g e t image
I p l I m a g e ∗ i m g t a r g o r i g , ∗ i m g t a r g ;
/ / For r e s u l t s
f l o a t b e s t S c o r e = −2; / / I n i t i a l i z e t o −2 ( l e s s than min s c o r e o f −1.0)
C v S c a l a r tempScore ;
I p l I m a g e ∗ r e s u l t ;
DIR ∗dp ;
char homeDir [ 2 5 6 ] ;
getcwd ( homeDir , 2 5 6 ) ;
s t r u c t d i r e n t ∗ e n t r y ;
s t r u c t s t a t s t a t b u f ;
i m g s r c = cvLoadImage ( sourceImage , CV LOAD IMAGE GRAYSCALE ) ;
i m g t a r g = cvLoadImage ( sourceImage , CV LOAD IMAGE GRAYSCALE ) ;
r e s u l t = cvCrea t e Image ( c v S i z e ( 1 , 1 ) , 32 , 1 ) ;
/ / I t e r a t e t h r o u g h images i n s p e c i f i e d f o l d e r
i f ( ( dp = o p e n d i r ( t a r g e t F o l d e r ) ) == NULL) {
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , ” c a n n o t open d i r e c t o r y : %s\n ” , t a r g e t F o l d e r ) ;
}
c h d i r ( t a r g e t F o l d e r ) ;
whi le ( ( e n t r y = r e a d d i r ( dp ) ) != NULL) {
l s t a t ( e n t r y−>d name , &s t a t b u f ) ;
i f ( ! S ISDIR ( s t a t b u f . s t mode ) ) {
/ / F i l e , n o t a d i r e c t o r y
/ / Open image and r e s i z e i t t o s o u r c e s i z e
i m g t a r g o r i g = cvLoadImage ( e n t r y−>d name , CV LOAD IMAGE GRAYSCALE ) ;
c v R e s i z e ( i m g t a r g o r i g , i m g t a r g , CV INTER CUBIC ) ;
/ / R e l e a s e image
cvRe lease Image (& i m g t a r g o r i g ) ;
/ / Compare i t t o t h e s o u r c e image
cvMatchTempla te ( img s rc , i m g t a r g , r e s u l t , CV TM CCOEFF NORMED ) ;
tempScore = cvGet2D ( r e s u l t , 0 , 0 ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Bes t s c o r e was %f ; %s s c o r e i s %f \n ” , b e s t S c o r e ,
e n t r y−>d name , tempScore . v a l [ 0 ] ) ;
/ / Check compar i son r e s u l t s
i f ( tempScore . v a l [ 0 ] > b e s t S c o r e ) {
b e s t S c o r e = tempScore . v a l [ 0 ] ;
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s p r i n t f ( myBestImage , ”%s /% s ” , t a r g e t F o l d e r , e n t r y−>d name ) ;
}
}
}
/ / R e l e a s e image r e s o u r c e s
cvRe lease Image (& i m g s r c ) ;
cvRe lea se Image (& i m g t a r g ) ;
cvRe lea se Image (& r e s u l t ) ;
c l o s e d i r ( dp ) ;
c h d i r ( homeDir ) ; / / back t o our i n i t i a l d i r e c t o r y
re turn b e s t S c o r e ;
}
# end i f
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Appendix B
Cloud worker client source
/∗
∗ C l i e n t . cpp
∗ Cloud worker c l i e n t code
∗ Author : Corey A . Beres ( cab3674@ri t . edu )
∗ /
# inc lude ” C l i e n t . h ”
# inc lude <s t d i o . h>
# inc lude <u n i s t d . h>
# inc lude < s t d l i b . h>
# inc lude <p t h r e a d . h>
# inc lude < s t r i n g . h>
# inc lude <t ime . h>
/ / S o c k e t s
# inc lude <s y s / t y p e s . h>
# inc lude <s y s / s o c k e t . h>
# inc lude <n e t i n e t / i n . h>
# inc lude <a r p a / i n e t . h>
# inc lude ” t e m p l a t e s . h ”
# inc lude ” i n p u t s . h ”
# inc lude ” A c t i o n s . h ”
# de f i n e PORT 6464
# de f i n e BUFFER SIZE 1024
# de f i n e CONNECT RETRY DELAY 2
us ing namespace s t d ;
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i n t C l i e n t : : c r e a t e S o c k e t ( ) {
s o c k l e n t l e n ;
s t r u c t s o c k a d d r i n a d d r e s s ;
s o c k f d = s o c k e t ( AF INET , SOCK STREAM, 0 ) ;
a d d r e s s . s i n f a m i l y = AF INET ;
a d d r e s s . s i n a d d r . s a d d r = i n e t a d d r ( ipAddr ) ;
a d d r e s s . s i n p o r t = h t o n s (PORT ) ;
l e n = s i z e o f ( a d d r e s s ) ;
whi le ( c o n n e c t ( sockfd , ( s t r u c t s o c k a d d r ∗)& a d d r e s s , l e n ) == −1) {
p r i n t f ( ” Could n o t c o n n e c t t o s e r v e r .\ n ” ) ;
s l e e p (CONNECT RETRY DELAY ) ;
}
re turn s o c k f d ;
}
bool C l i e n t : : waitForCommand ( ) {
i n t a c t i o n C o d e = 0 ;
i n t u s e r I d = −1;
t ry {
t r a n s m i t . r e c v (& ac t ionCode , s i z e o f ( a c t i o n C o d e ) ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Rece ived a c t i o n code : %d .\ n ” , a c t i o n C o d e ) ;
sw i t ch ( a c t i o n C o d e ) {
case ACTION RAY TRACE :
t r a n s m i t . r e c v (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
exampleRayTraceScore ( u s e r I d ) ;
break ;
case ACTION BEST IMAGE :
t r a n s m i t . r e c v (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
exampleRayTraceImage ( u s e r I d ) ;
break ;
case ACTION STATUS UPDATE :
t r a n s m i t . r e c v (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
u p d a t e S e r v e r ( u s e r I d ) ;
break ;
case ACTION ECHO :
t r a n s m i t . r e c v (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
echo ( u s e r I d ) ;
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break ;
de f au l t :
p r i n t f ( ” Rece ived unknown code : %d .\ n ” , a c t i o n C o d e ) ;
re turn f a l s e ;
}
} catch ( T r a n s m i s s i o n E x c e p t i o n &e ) {
p r i n t f ( ”%s\n ” , e . what ( ) ) ;
i f ( e . i s D i s c o n n e c t N e e d e d ( ) ) {
/ / Re tu r n f a l s e i f we s h o u l d d i s c o n n e c t
re turn f a l s e ;
}
}
re turn true ;
}
void C l i e n t : : exampleRayTraceScore ( cons t i n t u s e r I d ) {
char ∗ b e s t I m a g e = new char [ BUFFER SIZE ] ;
char ∗ rtCommand = new char [ BUFFER SIZE ] ;
i n t code = ACTION RECV FLOAT ;
f l o a t b e s t S c o r e ;
t i m e t r t S t a r t , r t S t o p ;
double i r T i me ;
/ / Per form p r o c e s s i n g
s p r i n t f ( rtCommand , ” / u s r / l o c a l / b i n / r t −s t − l 100 −w %d −h %d −f %s ” ,
INPUT WIDTH , INPUT HEIGHT , INPUT FILE ) ;
t ime (& r t S t a r t ) ;
/ / Ray t r a c i n g
sys tem ( rtCommand ) ;
t ime (& r t S t o p ) ;
i r T i me = c l o c k ( ) ;
/ / Image r e t r i e v a l
b e s t S c o r e = g e t B e s t M a t c h ( INPUT FILE , INPUT FOLDER ) ;
i r T i me = ( c l o c k ( ) − i r T i me ) / CLOCKS PER SEC ;
g e t B e s t I m a g e P a t h ( bes t Image , BUFFER SIZE ) ;
/ / Save b e s t r e s u l t f o r l a t e r
sem wai t (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
r e s u l t s . i n s e r t ( p a i r<i n t , s t r i n g >( u s e r I d , b e s t I m a g e ) ) ;
s e m p o s t (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
/ / Send b e s t s c o r e
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t r a n s m i t . send (&code , s i z e o f ( code ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (& b e s t S c o r e , s i z e o f ( b e s t S c o r e ) ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”Ray t r a c i n g comple t ed i n %05.3 l f s .\ nImage r e t r i e v a l comple t ed i n %05.3 l f s .\ n ” ,
d i f f t i m e ( r t S t o p , r t S t a r t ) , i rT ime ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Sen t s c o r e %l f t o s e r v e r .\ n ” , b e s t S c o r e ) ;
d e l e t e b e s t I m a g e ;
d e l e t e rtCommand ;
}
void C l i e n t : : exampleRayTraceImage ( cons t i n t u s e r I d ) {
i n t code = ACTION RECV FILE ;
map<i n t , s t r i n g > : : i t e r a t o r i t e r ;
/ / Get i t e r a t o r t o r e s u l t
sem wai t (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
i t e r = r e s u l t s . f i n d ( u s e r I d ) ;
s e m p o s t (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
/ / Re tu r n r e s u l t i f t h e r e i s one
i f ( i t e r != r e s u l t s . end ( ) ) {
t r a n s m i t . send (&code , s i z e o f ( code ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . s e n d F i l e ( i t e r −>second . c s t r ( ) ) ;
/ / Remove r e s u l t ( o t h e r w i s e we ’ l l a c c u m u l a t e t o n s o f them )
sem wai t (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
r e s u l t s . e r a s e ( i t e r ) ;
s e m p o s t (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” Sen t %s t o s e r v e r .\ n ” , i t e r −>second . c s t r ( ) ) ;
}
}
void C l i e n t : : u p d a t e S e r v e r ( cons t i n t u s e r I d ) {
i n t code = ACTION RECV INT ;
i n t v a l u e = 1 ;
t r a n s m i t . send (&code , s i z e o f ( code ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (& va lue , s i z e o f ( v a l u e ) ) ;
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}
void C l i e n t : : echo ( cons t i n t u s e r I d ) {
i n t code = ACTION RECV BLOB ;
char ∗ echo = new char [ BUFFER SIZE ] ;
char ∗ohce , ∗pohce ;
i n t s i z e = 0 ;
i n t newSize = 0 ;
i n t numCopies ;
i n t i ;
/ / R e c e i v e da ta s i z e and da ta
t r a n s m i t . r e c v (& s i z e , s i z e o f ( s i z e ) ) ;
i f ( s i z e > BUFFER SIZE ) {
s i z e = BUFFER SIZE ;
}
t r a n s m i t . r e c v ( echo , s i z e ) ;
/ / Number o f t i m e s t o copy s t r i n g
numCopies = BUFFER SIZE / s i z e ;
/ / A l l o c a t e memory
ohce = new char [ BUFFER SIZE ] ;
pohce = ohce ;
/ / Per form c o p y i n g
f o r ( i = 0 ; i < numCopies ; ++ i ) {
i f ( i % 2 == 0) {
/ / Copy
memcpy ( pohce , echo , s i z e − 1 ) ;
newSize += s i z e − 1 ;
pohce += s i z e − 1 ;
} e l s e {
/ / R e v e r s e and copy
reverseAndCopy ( pohce , echo , s i z e − 1 ) ;
newSize += s i z e − 1 ;
pohce += s i z e − 1 ;
}
}
/ / Copy l a s t char ( n u l l char ? )
∗pohce = echo [ s i z e − 1 ] ;
++ newSize ;
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/ / Send back s t r i n g
t r a n s m i t . send (&code , s i z e o f ( code ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (& u s e r I d , s i z e o f ( u s e r I d ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send (&newSize , s i z e o f ( newSize ) ) ;
t r a n s m i t . send ( ohce , newSize ) ;
d e l e t e echo ;
d e l e t e ohce ;
}
void C l i e n t : : Run ( ) {
char ∗ b u f f e r = new char [ BUFFER SIZE ] ;
/∗ CHAP s t u f f ∗ /
CHAP HEADER chapHeader ;
char ∗message , ∗ v a l u e ;
s t r i n g s C h a l l e n g e ;
i n t msgLen ;
unsigned char chapIdC , chapIdS , v a l u e S i z e ;
bool v a l i d = f a l s e ;
bool s u c c e s s = f a l s e ;
p r i n t f ( ” C o n n e c t i n g t o s e r v e r . . . \ n ” ) ;
c r e a t e S o c k e t ( ) ;
p r i n t f ( ” S e r v e r c o n n e c t e d .\ n ” ) ;
/ / S e t s o c k e t
t r a n s m i t . s e t S o c k f d ( s o c k f d ) ;
/ / Use d e f a u l t key f o r e n c r y p t i o n
T r a n s m i s s i o n tempTrans ( s o c k f d ) ;
t ry {
/ / R e c e i v e c h a l l e n g e
t empTrans . r e c v (& chapHeader , s i z e o f ( chapHeader ) ) ;
i f ( chapHeader . a c t i o n == ACTION CHAP) {
/ / R e c e i v e d c h a l l e n g e
t empTrans . r e c v ( b u f f e r , chapHeader . l e n g t h ) ;
v a l i d = chap . c h a l l e n g e B r e a k o u t ( b u f f e r , chapIdC , va lue , v a l u e S i z e ) ;
i f ( v a l i d && v a l u e S i z e > 0) {
s C h a l l e n g e = s t r i n g ( va lue , v a l u e S i z e ) ;
/ / Make r e s p o n s e
msgLen = chap . r e s p o n s e ( message , chapIdC , s C h a l l e n g e . c s t r ( ) ,
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s C h a l l e n g e . s i z e ( ) , hash , s t r l e n ( hash ) ,
name , s t r l e n ( name ) ) ;
chapHeader . a c t i o n = ACTION CHAP ;
chapHeader . l e n g t h = msgLen ;
/ / Send r e s p o n s e
t empTrans . send (& chapHeader , s i z e o f ( chapHeader ) ) ;
t empTrans . send ( message , msgLen ) ;
d e l e t e message ;
/ / R e c e i v e s u c c e s s / f a i l u r e
t empTrans . r e c v (& chapHeader , s i z e o f ( chapHeader ) ) ;
i f ( chapHeader . a c t i o n == ACTION CHAP) {
/ / R e c e i v e d s u c c e s s / f a i l u r e
t empTrans . r e c v ( b u f f e r , chapHeader . l e n g t h ) ;
s u c c e s s = chap . s u c c e s s B r e a k o u t ( b u f f e r , chapIdS ) ;
}
}
}
} catch ( T r a n s m i s s i o n E x c e p t i o n &e ) {
p r i n t f ( ”%s\n ” , e . what ( ) ) ;
}
d e l e t e b u f f e r ;
i f ( s u c c e s s ) {
/ / A u t h e n t i c a t i o n s u c c e e d e d
f o r ( ; ; ) {
i f ( ! waitForCommand ( ) ) {
/ / D i s c o n n e c t and c l o s e
break ;
}
}
}
p t h r e a d e x i t ( 0 ) ;
}
void C l i e n t : : reverseAndCopy ( char ∗out , cons t char ∗ in , cons t i n t num ) {
i n t c ;
f o r ( c = 0 ; c < num ; ++c ) {
o u t [ num − c − 1] = i n [ c ] ;
}
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}
void C l i e n t : : d i s p o s e ( ) {
i n t code = 0 ;
t r a n s m i t . send (&code , s i z e o f ( code ) ) ;
}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ C o n s t r u c t o r
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ /
C l i e n t : : C l i e n t ( char ∗ ipAddr , cons t char ∗ name , cons t char ∗ hash ,
cons t char ∗key ) : t r a n s m i t ( key ) {
ipAddr = i p A d dr ;
name = name ;
hash = h a s h ;
s e m i n i t (& r e s u l t S e m , 0 , 1 ) ;
S t a r t ( ) ;
}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ D e c o n s t r u c t o r
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ /
C l i e n t : : ˜ C l i e n t ( ) {
c l o s e ( s o c k f d ) ;
s e m d e s t r o y (& r e s u l t S e m ) ;
}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ S t a r t − c r e a t e s t h e t h r e a d f o r t h e o b j e c t t o run i n
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ /
void C l i e n t : : S t a r t ( ) {
p t h r e a d c r e a t e (& t i d , 0 , S tar tMe , t h i s ) ;
}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ S tar tMe − r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s t a r t i n g t h e c o n t r o l f l o w o f t h e t h r e a d
∗ a f t e r t h a t t h r e a d has been c r e a t e d
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ /
void ∗ C l i e n t : : S t a r tMe ( void ∗ p t r ) {
C l i e n t ∗ me = ( C l i e n t ∗ ) p t r ;
me−>Run ( ) ;
re turn NULL;
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}
/∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
∗ GetT id − r e t u r n s t h e t h r e a d ID
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ /
p t h r e a d t C l i e n t : : GetTid ( ) {
re turn th i s−> t i d ;
}
64
Appendix C
Result manager source
package edu . r i t . ce . n e t i p . c l o u d . a n d r o i d . c l o u d s m a r t . s e r v e r ;
import j a v a . u t i l . Map ;
import j a v a . u t i l . c o n c u r r e n t . ConcurrentHashMap ;
pub l i c c l a s s Redundan tResu l tManager<T ex tends Comparable<T>> implements Resul tManager<T> {
pr i v a t e f i n a l double RESULT RATIO = 0 . 5 ;
pr i v a t e ConcurrentHashMap<I n t e g e r , T> r e s u l t s ;
pr i v a t e ConcurrentHashMap<T , I n t e g e r> r e s u l t F r e q ;
pr i v a t e i n t nodes ;
pr i v a t e boolean asked ;
pub l i c Redundan tResu l tManager ( ) {
r e s u l t F r e q = new ConcurrentHashMap<T , I n t e g e r > ( ) ;
r e s u l t s = new ConcurrentHashMap<I n t e g e r , T> ( ) ;
nodes = 0 ;
asked = f a l s e ;
}
@Override
pub l i c synchronized i n t ge tNodes ( ) {
re turn nodes ;
}
@Override
pub l i c synchronized void s e t N o d e s ( i n t nodes ) {
t h i s . nodes = nodes ;
}
@Override
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pub l i c synchronized void c l e a r ( ) {
r e s u l t F r e q . c l e a r ( ) ;
r e s u l t s . c l e a r ( ) ;
nodes = 0 ;
asked = f a l s e ;
}
@Override
pub l i c synchronized void removeNode ( i n t nodeId ) {
−−nodes ;
r e s u l t s . remove ( nodeId ) ;
a sked = f a l s e ;
r e s u l t F r e q . c l e a r ( ) ;
f o r (Map . Ent ry<I n t e g e r , T> r e s u l t : r e s u l t s . e n t r y S e t ( ) ) {
a d d R e s u l t ( r e s u l t . g e t V a l u e ( ) ) ;
}
}
@Override
pub l i c i n t ge tBes tNode ( ) throws R e s u l t N o t R e a d y E x c e p t i o n {
boolean r e a d y = t rue ;
i n t nodeId = 0 ;
T b e s t = nu l l ;
Map . Ent ry<T , I n t e g e r> mostFreq = g e t M o s t F r e q u e n t ( ) ;
i f ( nodes < −1) {
/ / Must be f i r s t
nodeId = −1;
} e l s e i f ( mos tFreq . g e t V a l u e ( ) > RESULT RATIO ∗ nodes && ! asked ) {
/ / Get mode f r e q u e n t r e s u l t
nodeId = getKeyByValue ( mos tFreq . getKey ( ) ) ;
a sked = t rue ;
} e l s e i f ( r e s u l t s . s i z e ( ) >= nodes && ! asked ) {
/ / Have a l l r e s u l t s , j u s t g e t t h e h i g h e s t r e s u l t
f o r (Map . Ent ry<I n t e g e r , T> r e s u l t : r e s u l t s . e n t r y S e t ( ) ) {
i f ( b e s t == nu l l | | r e s u l t . g e t V a l u e ( ) . compareTo ( b e s t ) > 0) {
b e s t = r e s u l t . g e t V a l u e ( ) ;
nodeId = r e s u l t . getKey ( ) ;
a sked = t rue ;
}
}
} e l s e {
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r e a d y = f a l s e ;
}
i f ( ! r e a d y ) {
throw new R e s u l t N o t R e a d y E x c e p t i o n ( ) ;
}
re turn nodeId ;
}
@Override
pub l i c synchronized void g i v e R e s u l t ( i n t nodeId , T r e s u l t ) {
r e s u l t s . p u t ( nodeId , r e s u l t ) ;
a d d R e s u l t ( r e s u l t ) ;
}
pr i v a t e void a d d R e s u l t ( T r e s u l t ) {
I n t e g e r I F r e q = r e s u l t F r e q . g e t ( r e s u l t ) ;
i n t f r e q = 1 ;
/ / I n c r e m e n t v a l u e i f i t was a l r e a d y p r e s e n t
i f ( I F r e q != nu l l ) {
f r e q = I F r e q + 1 ;
}
r e s u l t F r e q . p u t ( r e s u l t , f r e q ) ;
}
pr i v a t e Map . Ent ry<T , I n t e g e r> g e t M o s t F r e q u e n t ( ) {
Map . Ent ry<T , I n t e g e r> f r e q = nu l l ;
f o r (Map . Ent ry<T , I n t e g e r> r f : r e s u l t F r e q . e n t r y S e t ( ) ) {
i f ( f r e q == nu l l | | r f . g e t V a l u e ( ) > f r e q . g e t V a l u e ( ) ) {
f r e q = r f ;
}
}
re turn f r e q ;
}
pr i v a t e i n t getKeyByValue ( T v a l u e ) {
i n t key = 0 ;
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f o r (Map . Ent ry<I n t e g e r , T> r e s u l t : r e s u l t s . e n t r y S e t ( ) ) {
i f ( r e s u l t . g e t V a l u e ( ) . e q u a l s ( v a l u e ) ) {
key = r e s u l t . getKey ( ) ;
}
}
re turn key ;
}
}
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Appendix D
Android application, main loop source
pub l i c vo id run ( ) {
byte [ ] b u f f e r , c h a l l e n g e , h e a d e r ;
i n t byteRead = 0 ;
f l o a t s c o r e = 0 ;
boolean done = f a l s e ;
boolean s u c c e s s = f a l s e ;
i n t l e n g t h ;
byte c ha p I d ;
Aes tempAes = new Aes ( ) ;
whi le ( ! done ) {
t ry {
c o n n e c t T o S e r v e r ( hos t , PORT ) ;
done = t rue ;
t ry {
/ / Per form CHAP a u t h e n t i c a t i o n
b u f f e r = r e c e i v e E n c ( b i s , tempAes , CHAP HEADER SIZE ) ;
i f ( b y t e A r r a y T o I n t ( b u f f e r ) == ACTION CHAP) {
/ / R e c e i v e c h a l l e n g e
l e n g t h = C l o u d C l i e n t . t h i s . ge tChapMessageS ize ( b u f f e r ) ;
b u f f e r = r e c e i v e E n c ( b i s , tempAes , l e n g t h ) ;
c ha p I d = chap . g e t I d ( b u f f e r ) ;
c h a l l e n g e = chap . g e t C h a l l e n g e ( b u f f e r ) ;
/ / Make / send r e s p o n s e
i f ( usePap ) {
/ / PAP
b u f f e r = ge tPapMessage ( ) ;
h e a d e r = ge tPapHeade r ( b u f f e r . l e n g t h ) ;
sendEnc ( bos , tempAes , h e a d e r ) ;
/ / Send as p l a i n t e x t , j u s t t o prove a p o i n t
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bos . w r i t e ( b u f f e r , 0 , b u f f e r . l e n g t h ) ;
bos . f l u s h ( ) ;
} e l s e {
/ / CHAP
b u f f e r = chap . r e s p o n s e ( chapId , c h a l l e n g e , hash . g e t B y t e s ( ”UTF−8” ) ,
username . g e t B y t e s ( ”UTF−8” ) ) ;
h e a d e r = ge tChapHeader ( b u f f e r . l e n g t h ) ;
sendEnc ( bos , tempAes , h e a d e r ) ;
sendEnc ( bos , tempAes , b u f f e r ) ;
}
/ / R e c e i v e r e s u l t
b u f f e r = r e c e i v e E n c ( b i s , tempAes , CHAP HEADER SIZE ) ;
i f ( b y t e A r r a y T o I n t ( b u f f e r ) == ACTION CHAP) {
l e n g t h = C l o u d C l i e n t . t h i s . ge tChapMessageS ize ( b u f f e r ) ;
b u f f e r = r e c e i v e E n c ( b i s , tempAes , l e n g t h ) ;
c ha p I d = chap . g e t I d ( b u f f e r ) ;
s u c c e s s = chap . g e t S u c c e s s ( b u f f e r ) ;
}
}
i f ( s u c c e s s ) { / / A u t h e n t i c a t i o n was s u c c e s s f u l
/ / Ask s e r v e r f o r r e s u l t
i f ( c h o o s e R e s u l t ) {
/ / Get i n t e r m e d i a t e r e s u l t s from s e r v e r s
sendEnc ( bos , i n t T o B y t e A r r a y ( ACTION BEST SCORE ) ) ;
} e l s e i f ( m u l t i p l e C l i e n t s ) {
/ / Make s e r v e r use m u l t i p l e c l i e n t s
sendEnc ( bos , i n t T o B y t e A r r a y (ACTION RAY TRACE ) ) ;
} e l s e {
/ / Make s e r v e r use a s i n g l e c l i e n t
sendEnc ( bos , i n t T o B y t e A r r a y ( ACTION SINGLE RAY TRACE ) ) ;
}
i f ( c h o o s e R e s u l t ) {
/ / Begin r e c e i v i n g da ta
b u f f e r = r e c e i v e E n c ( b i s , 4 ) ;
i f ( b u f f e r != nu l l ) {
byteRead = b y t e A r r a y T o I n t ( b u f f e r ) ;
Log . i (TAG, ” Rece ived b y t e ” + byteRead ) ;
} e l s e {
byteRead = −1;
}
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i f ( by teRead == ACTION FLOAT RESULT ) {
b u f f e r = r e c e i v e E n c ( b i s , 4 ) ;
i f ( b u f f e r != nu l l ) {
s c o r e = F l o a t . i n t B i t s T o F l o a t ( b y t e A r r a y T o I n t ( b u f f e r ) ) ;
rm . g i v e R e s u l t ( id , s c o r e ) ;
s e tChanged ( ) ;
n o t i f y O b s e r v e r s ( ) ;
Log . i (TAG, ” Rece ived s c o r e ” + s c o r e ) ;
} e l s e {
byteRead = −1;
}
}
} e l s e {
/ / F i l e w i l l be s e n t a u t o m a t i c a l l y
rm . g i v e R e s u l t ( id , 1 f ) ;
s e tChanged ( ) ;
n o t i f y O b s e r v e r s ( ) ;
}
}
} catch ( IOExcep t ion e ) {
Log . e (TAG, e . ge tMessage ( ) ) ;
}
} ca tch ( UnknownHostExcept ion e ) {
/ / TODO Auto−g e n e r a t e d c a t c h b l o c k
e . p r i n t S t a c k T r a c e ( ) ;
} ca tch ( IOExcep t ion e ) {
/ / TODO Auto−g e n e r a t e d c a t c h b l o c k
e . p r i n t S t a c k T r a c e ( ) ;
}
}
}
